The No ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’ Argument
Faulty Thinking in Ethics and Social Science
Abstract
According to Hilary Putnam, the ‘moral is clear: when we are dealing with any important value disagreement, we assume facts are irrelevant at our peril. No convincing logical reason can be given for the logical irrelevance of fact to value judgements, even if we accept the positivist conception of what a “fact” is.’ (2002, p. 78) This paper explores why the dichotomies engendered by the ‘positivist’ approach – fact/value, positive/normative and descriptive/evaluative – are false. The main reason, the paper argues, is that the fundamental principle underlying the approach fails. This principle, the ‘no ought from is argument’ (or the NOFIA), is the formally structured argument that a value (ought) cannot logically be derived from a fact (is). The paper rejects the NOFIA and, especially, its iconic status in economics. Using criticisms of the NOFIA by John Searle, Amartya Sen, Hilary Putnam, Vivian Walsh and Julius Kovesi, as well as the critical realist method of explanatory critique, the paper argues for a form of moral realism.
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