一、引言
Professor Sheng Xuan Guo
North West University of Political Science and Law
China
公司是法律创设出来的具有团体人格的法人，作为私法主体，被认为享有自治的自由。公司也被认为是股东投资谋取利益的工具，被股东尤其是大股东控制，是股东放飞的风筝。公司还被认为是一组契约的结合，是利益相关者的聚集地，是社会的组成细胞。公司被描绘成理想国，被视作乌托邦。……公司、股东、董事、经理、债权人、员工等有着不同利益诉求的主体，通过一定形式的公司治理结构共存于公司躯壳。
A corporation is a legal person with group personality created by the law and is considered to have the freedom of autonomy as a subject of private law. A corporation is also considered as shareholders’ tool to pursue profit just like a kite flown by shareholders especially substantial shareholders. A corporation is considered as a contractual combination, a gathering place of stakeholders and constituting a cell of society. A corporation is described as a Utopia. …With different interest claims, subjects such as management, shareholders, directors, creditors, employees and others who coexist in a corporation through the certain formal structure of corporate governance.
无论是公司工具者所持的以公司股东权为核心构筑公司治理结构，还是公司契约论者所强调的多元利益者共同治理，公司都依靠章程自治，通过内设于公司的股东会、董事会、经理及监事会制度，构建起了公司相关人之间权利义务结构，似乎是一个高度自治的独立王国。无论基于理论分析，还是实证观察，在公司治理中，公司、股东、董事等主体的行为或不行为，往往造成公司运行的低效、无效，以及非正义、不公平以及权利失衡的结果，而公司自治机制不能自行纠错。
Whether according to opinion which demands building a corporate governance structure with shareholder’s rights as the core, or according to corporate contract theory, which stresses that multiple stakeholders should be subject to a common governance, a corporation always depends on articles of association to realize its autonomy. It seems to be an independent kingdom with a high-degree of autonomy relying on a rights and obligations structure between corporate stakeholders that is constructed by the inner system of board of shareholders, board of directors, managers and board of supervisors. Based on either theoretical analysis or empirical study, the feasance or nonfeasance of company, shareholders, directors and other subjects usually leads to low efficiency, invalidity, injustice and inequality and unbalanced rights during corporate governance. However, the corporate autonomy mechanism is not able to correct itself.
各国公司法都不同程度地通过股东权保护机制，完善公司治理，股东通过直接诉讼或代表诉讼的途径，维护股东或公司权益，保障公司的有效运行。但是，此种情形下的司法介入，正如其他私权借助司法介入而获得公力救济一样，不属于本文要讨论的问题范畴。本文关注的司法介入公司治理，是突破“司法不介入公司自治”的观念，对公司组织运行（内部事务管理）中，以所谓公司章程规定、股东会决议等权利盾牌掩护的非正义、不公平、无效或失效的公司行为的司法干预和矫正。比如：公司规章制度带有对歧视性和不平等规定的审查与纠正1；公司股东会、董事会召集障碍的排解；公司董事的特别任职与解任；妨碍公平的资本多数决“暴政”的防止；董事违法行为的制止；有害关联交易的防范。等等。诸如此类在公司治理层面依靠内部解决机制难以解决的问题，需要司法介入予以裁判和矫正，伸张正义和公平。
The various company laws in all countries inordinately improve corporate governance through shareholders’ rights protection mechanisms by which shareholders protect their or the corporation’s rights and ensure that a company runs efficiently through direct action and representative action. However, judicial intervention under this circumstance, just like other private rights protected by public power by virtue of judicial intervention, does not belong within the scope of issues discussed in the article. The judicial intervention to corporate governance discussed in this text, beyond the concept of “judicial nonintervention to corporate governance”, refers to the judicial involvement and correction to the unjust, unfair and invalid or expired corporate performance shielded by the rights stipulated by the articles of association and resolutions of shareholder meetings affecting a corporation’s operations (inner affairs management). Judicial intervention includes the review and correction of discriminatory1 and unequal corporate regulations, the resolution of obstacles to convening shareholder meetings and director meetings, special service or recall of company directors, the “tyranny” of prevention of majority decisions regarding capital expenditure which hampers justice, the prevention of director’s illegal behavior, the precaution of harmful connected transaction, etc. Such problems are difficult solve through inner settlement mechanisms within the scope of corporate governance, and therefore judicial intervention is required to make judgments and correction that will uphold justice and fairness.
司法应当可以满足公司治理之“需求”，但问题是，如何“供给”？换句话说，司法介入公司治理的进路是什么？司法介入公司治理的诉讼机制、裁判手段以及应恪守的限度，如何在现有的司法体制内有效构造？法院是否应对公司治理纠纷由消极、滞后的裁判路径转向积极、事先的干预?是否应从有限的干预转向更深广的领域介入呢?司法如何能在干预公司自治中，保障公司正常、良性运行？干预的有效性保障是什么，等等，还有太多的问题需要研究。限于篇幅，更限于研究者的能力，本文对司法介入公司治理的进路做出一个纲要式的初步探讨。
Justice can satisfy the “need” of corporate governance, but the question is how to “supply” it? In other words, what is the approach of judicial intervention to corporate governance? Specifically, how to effectively construct a litigation system, judgment methods and the limitations to abide by in judicial intervention in corporate governance in the present judicial system? Should courts change their approach of judicial intervention from negative and hysteretic judgment to positive and beforehand intervention? Should the limited intervention turn to a broader scope? How can justice guarantee the company formal and healthy operation during its intervention to corporate governance? How can the effectiveness of the intervention be ensured? Accordingly, there are so many problems need researching. Due to the limitation of space and the author’s capability, the article makes an outline and preliminary discussion of the approach of judicial intervention to corporate governance.
制度是一种演化秩序。英美法通过判例逐渐确立的司法对公司有限干预的历史轨迹，已经证明了公司治理需要司法干预。对公司治理需要司法介入的理由，也可以从多角度加以分析，2本文在这里试图结合两种类型的公司治理观——股东自治治理观和利益相关者共同治理治理观，结合公司治理的效力目标，分析和说明司法介入公司治理的必要性和重要性。
A system is a kind of evolutionary order. The historical track along which common law gradually established the limits to judicial intervention in a company through legal precedents has proved that corporate governance needs judicial intervention. The cause of the need can be analyzed from various perspectives2，and this article tries to analyze and explain the necessity and importance of judicial intervention to corporate governance through combining two concepts of corporate governance—shareholder autonomy and stakeholder co-governance with the corporate effectiveness goal.
公司法的传统理论坚持公司工具论，认为，公司的法人性仅是公司外在的特征，股东是公司的所有者权益的承担者，公司为股东投资的工具则是公司最为基础的本质。股东作为公司的所有者在公司自治中居于核心地位，现代公司自治实质上即为股东的自治。公司及公司制度的产生与发展均是以股东为核心力量进行的，公司制度功能的发挥关键在于股东自治的实现。但是，股东自治为中心的公司治理表明，在公司经营管理事务中，多数股东的意见会被接受采纳。公司的多数股东拥有最终决策权。多数股东经普通决议或者特别决议对任何事项所作出的决定，对公司全体股东具有约束力。对于经多数投票决定的事项，少数股东必须接受并遵守多数股东的意愿。 3
1. The need to protect the rights of minority shareholder under shareholder autonomy. The traditional theory of company law insists on company law theory which considers that a company’s legal personality is just its superficial characteristic and shareholders are undertakers of owner’s equity and therefore the fundamental corporate nature is that of a shareholders’ investment tool. Shareholders occupy the core positions as company owners in corporate autonomy and hence modern company autonomy is shareholder’s autonomy in essence. The emergence and development of a company and company systems take place with shareholders as the core pushing power, and the function performance of the company system mainly depends on the realization of shareholder autonomy. However, the corporate governance with shareholder autonomy at its center indicates that the majority shareholders’ opinions will be adopted to deal with company business and management affairs. Therefore, the majority shareholders in a company have the final decision-making right and their decision on any matter made through an ordinary or special resolution shall be binding on all shareholders. As to the matter decided by majority voting, the minority shareholders have to comply with the majority shareholders’ will.3
理论上以及实践观察所见，多数股东会利用其控制地位，压制少数股东、规避公司章程中的特定条款或者为多数股东自身从公司获取最大利益和财富。当多数股东任意滥用所谓的民主权利时，公司将无法确保公平交易，股东个人权利也得不到尊重，股东多数决原则的滥用在非上市公司中表现得更为明显。因为“在一个非上市公司中，公司集中控制的规范和多数决规则容易变成压制性的工具。一些对公司成员十分重要的决策，例如有关用工、薪酬的决策，都由董事会决定。当成员之间的关系不再和睦，少数成员会发现多数成员会以意想不到的方式管理公司事务。控制着董事会的多数股东可以终止少数股东的雇佣关系，从而减少对其投资的回报。公司可以不支付股东股利，以避免双重征税，但是多数股东可以通过工资、或者收取租金或公司现金贷款的利息等方式获得他们的投资回报。在排除了少数股东后，这些收益额还会增长。公司形式的持久存续性更使得少数股东处于两难之境。没有工作，没有股利，少数股东面临的是一个不确定的未来，他或她得不到对公司资本投资的回报。多数股东甚至能够通过高薪或租金的形式抽取公司资产，来拒绝给予少数股东长期投资的回报，并假借商业判断规则来规避司法审查。另外，多数股东还会以不公正的理由逼迫少数股东离开公司”。4
According to theoretical study and practical observation, the majority shareholders take advantage of their controlling position to suppress the minority shareholders, to avoid certain items in articles of association or to gain the maximum interest and wealth from the company for themselves. When the majority shareholders abuse the so-called democratic rights arbitrarily the company will not ensure an even bargain and shareholders’ individual rights will not be respected. The abuse of majority rule shows more obviously in a non-listed company, because “In a closed setting, the corporate norms of centralized control and majority rule can become instruments of oppression. Some decisions vitally important to participants, such as their employment and salary, are left to the board of directors to make. When harmony between participants disappears, the minority participants may find that the majority interest can manage the affairs of the corporation in unexpected ways. The minority dominating the board can terminate minority shareholders’ employment as officers, thereby diminishing the return on their investments. The corporation may not pay dividends to any shareholders to avoid double taxation, yet the majority shareholders will continue to receive a return on their investment in the form of salary or perhaps rent or interest on money loaned to the corporation. Indeed, these amounts may increase after the minority shareholders are excluded.
Traditionally, the minority shareholders have had no way to protect themselves against such an occurrence. If minority shareholders attempt to establish a contract for protection against this possibility, such as by agreements that the minority shareholder retain a corporate office and a salary, courts earlier this century struck down the agreement as an unlawful interference with the unfettered discretion of directors. The performance of the corporate form further compounds the minority shareholder’s dilemma. Without a job and in the absence of dividends, the minority shareholder may face an indefinite future with no return on the capital he or she contribution to the enterprise. The majority may even be able to deny the minority shareholders any return in the long run by siphoning off corporate assets in the form of high salaries or rents, insulated from judicial review by the business judgment rule. In addition, the majority may force the minority to leave the company with unjust excuses.”4
在中国大陆，国有企业以及家族企业在上市公司中普遍存在，传统的集中经济型体制以及文化氛围造就了上市公司高度集中的股权结构。又由于上市公司股东人数众多且多为散户，频繁转股，集体行动“搭便车”消极参与公司治理，这些因素导致“内部人控制”普遍存在于上市公司。在这些公司中控制股东拥有远远超过中小股东的实际特权，不仅仅拥有股东权，还操纵控制监事、董事甚至于经营者的权利行使。大股东利用其对股东大会、董事会的控制形成决策，为达成自己的特殊目的而漠视中小投资者的利益，甚至不惜侵犯中小股东利益。这类纠纷在上市公司中层出不穷，如关联交易、侵吞公司资产等。董事会的独立地位丧失很难形成独立的经营决策，与此同时更难以发挥它的监控职能。5公司法存在短板：股东会决议代替股东共益权具有合理性，但代替、压制股东自益权，缺少正当性基础。
There are many state-owned firms and family businesses among listed firms in China mainland. The traditional centralized economic system and cultural atmosphere have resulted in a highly centralized ownership structure in the listed companies. Moreover, the listed firms have a large number of shareholders who are retail investors. A majority of these can exchange shares frequently that is their collective “hitch-hiking” impacts on a corporation’s share price, and negatively on corporate governance. All of these factors lead to the ubiquity of “insider control” in listed firms. In these firms, the controlling shareholders enjoy far more practical privileges than the minority shareholders, and they not only own the shareholders’ rights but also manipulate and control the practice of the rights of supervisors, directors, even operators. By taking advantage of their control on the general meeting of shareholders and the board of directors, the big shareholders reach resolutions so as to achieve their special purposes while disregarding, even infringing the rights and benefits of small investors. These sorts of disputes frequently occur in the listed companies in respect to affiliate transactions, and annexation of firms’ properties.
The board of directors loses its independent status, which makes it difficult to achieve a decision independently and at the same time, fails to perform its function of supervision. 5There is an obvious shortcoming of company law; in response, it is reasonable to use resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings to replace the common-interest rights of shareholders when the law lacks a legitimate basis to replace and suppress the self-interest actions of shareholders.
（二）共同治理下多元利益均衡保护的需要
2. The demand of balanced protection for multiple interests under common governance
基于公司契约论6，公司是股东、经理、雇员、供应商、顾客、债权人等在内的各主体之间一系列契约关系的联结（a nexus of contracts），公司利益相关者应当共同参与治理。因此，需要构建多元利益者表达诉求的通道和平台，员工、债权人以及公益组织代表处于弱势的利益相关者，需要第三者评判、矫正非正义的自治行为，平衡保护各方利益。
Based on the company contract theory, a company is a nexus of contracts between shareholders, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and others. This paper argues that the company stakeholders should participate in its governance. For this purpose, it is necessary to build channels and platforms where multiple stakeholders can voice their demands and requirements; for staff, creditors and shareholders representing the interests of disadvantaged organizations, a third party is necessary to judge and correct unjust autonomous conduct, and properly protect the interests of each party .
公司是一个彻头彻尾的追求私利的个人还是一个承载了对劳动者、消费者、社区居民、政府应尽之责的缩小了的社会细胞，争论还在继续。在事实上，以股东为中心的股东自治理论在中国大陆占据主导地位，公司立法、司法深受其影响。7
A company is an individual pursuing profit from head to toe，or alternatively is a miniature cell in society that shoulders responsibility for workers, customers, community members, and the government; the debate will continue. In fact, the theory that shareholders are the center of corporate governance has dominated governance in mainland China. Company legislation and justice are deeply influenced by it.7
控股股东与中小股东，公司与董事，股东与董事，债权人与公司、股东及董事，公司与员工之间关系的复杂性，以股东为中心的公司治理惯性思维，公司法没有对利益相关者的权利救济问题予以重视和设置有效的救济制度，需要依赖借鉴英美法上的“信义义务”“经营者判断”“商业判断”等理念，由法官自由裁量个案中相关权利人救济的正当性及其权益保护问题。在中国大陆司法体制下，可以先通过最高法院发布指导判例的方式，继而通过司法解释的途径，最终通过修改公司法，确定司法对公司治理介入的原则、途径以及必要的限制。
The shortcomings of company law are: since the relationships between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, companies and directors, shareholders and directors, debtors and companies, shareholders and directors, and companies and staff are very complicated, and the habitual thought of governing companies centers on shareholders, company law neither emphasizes the rights or problems of many shareholders, nor sets an effective relief system. It is necessary to depend on and learn from some concepts and values in Anglo-American Law such as “fiduciary obligation” “judgment of operators” and “business judgment”, so that judges can discretionarily judge the legitimacy of shareholders and protect their rights and benefits in certain cases. In the Chinese mainland judicial system，it may be through the way of a Supreme Court case to guide the Primary Court firstly, and then by way of judicial interpretation, and ultimately by modifying the Companies Act, to determine the principles of judicial intervention on corporate governance, ways and necessary restrictions.
（三）公司治理追求有效秩序的需求
3. The demand of pursuing effective order in company governance
公司治理的法秩序实现是公司自治和国家强制(立法规制、司法介入)的统一。司法介入公司治理本质上体现为对公司自治的一种国家意志之矫正。加拿大著名公司法专家柴芬斯从促进效率和实现公平的两重目标出发，对司法介入公司的运营作了分析8。就效率目标而言,首先，由于不完整的信息问题，包括系统性的信息问题和信息不均衡问题，可能导致公司合同存在缝隙、合同制订存在欺诈以及存在“柠檬市场”等现象，造成资源的浪费，为此，司法有必要介入。其次，私人订立合同成本巨大，国家通过强制性的法律模本可以减少缔约成本。再次,国家强制可以解决消极“外部化”问题以及集体行动问题(博弈论解释了为什么个体交易者以最大化自己利益的策略行事,却可能得到无效率的结果)。就公平目标而言，国家强制会适当地阻止那些欺诈、误导、胁迫行为,并给予处于弱势地位者以特别关注，对公司的实际控制者科以严格的信义义务从而实现大小股东的公正对待和相互之间利益的平衡。国家强制也同样可以限制竞争的无序，创造公平竞争的市场机制，确保市场参与者遵循基本的道德准则。
The realization of lawful order in company governance is through unification between company autonomy and national enforcement (legislative regulation and judicial intervention). The judicial intervention in company management substantially reflects the state’s will to correct company autonomy. Cheffins, a Canadian expert on company law analyzes judicial intervention in the operation of company from the dual goals of promoting efficiency and realizing fairness8. When it comes to the goal of efficiency, firstly, it is necessary for the judiciary to get intervention since the problem of incomplete information, including the problem of systematic information and unbalanced information, may cause the existence of a gap in a company contract, fraud in contract system, and a "lemons market", resulting in the waste of company resources; secondly, the cost of private conclusion to a contract is very huge, and the contracting cost can be reduced through mandatory law texts of the state; and thirdly, national enforcement can solve the problem of negative “externalization” as well as collective actions (game theory explains the reason why an individual trader practices in a way that can maximize his own benefits but obtain a result without efficiency). As for a fair goal, national enforcement can appropriately prevent those fraudulent, misleading, and coercive conduct while paying more attention to the underprivileged ones. Moreover, the actual controllers of the company will have to shoulder strict fiduciary duties so that fair treatment to small and big shareholders and balanced interests among them can be realized. Furthermore, national enforcement can also restrict disordered competition and create a market mechanism with fair competition, ensuring that market participants observe the basic moral codes.
（一）司法功能包含着对公司治理的外部保障
1. Judiciary function including an exterior safeguard for company management
公司治理是一个复查系统，涵盖了公司内部和外部不同的制度结构。司法与行政共同构成公司治理的外部监控机制，司法机构及其代表的法律制度，又是公司治理的外部保障机制。司法机构代表国家意志，评判公司自治（私人）行为，矫正非正义的、利益失衡的自治行为，保障相关当事人的权利，维护公司自治的良好秩序。司法权通过民事诉讼的途径介入公司自治，可以保障权利，协调公司内部利益关系和公司与外部的关系，促进公司自治的有序有效地进行。
As a recheck system, company management covers different system structures inside and outside companies. The judiciary and administration together constitute an exterior monitoring mechanism of company management. Judiciary organizations and legal systems represented by the organizations are also an exterior safeguard mechanism of company management. Judiciary organizations represent the will of the state to judge company autonomy (private) conducts, correct autonomy conducts of injustice and imbalanced interests, safeguard the rights of relevant parties, and maintain a sound order of company autonomy. Jurisdiction intervention to company autonomy in the way of civil action can safeguard the rights, coordinate benefits relationships inside companies and the relationship between companies and the outside, and promote company autonomy in ways that are both orderly and efficient.
1.司法的权利保障功能（权利保护救济型介入）。
(1) Rights safeguard function of jurisdiction (intervention to a rights safeguard and relief type)
权利分为实体（质）权和程序权（救济权)。“有权利即有保护，没有救济就没有权利”。赋予实质权必要的救济来保护实质权为民事诉讼的目的。9另一方面，民事诉讼制度的目的在于解决纠纷，不解决私人间的纠纷，民事诉讼制度就没有意义。10纠纷是司法权作用的对象，保障权利是司法的功能。
Rights are divided into substantial rights and procedural rights (relief rights). “Where there are rights, there is protection; there will be no rights if remedies do not exist”. The purpose of civil action lies in protection for the substantial rights by offering necessary remedies to the substantial rights.9 On the other hand, the purpose of civil action also lies in settling disputes, so the system of civil action will become meaningless if disputes between individuals fail to be settlrd.10 Disputes are objects of the jurisdiction function and safeguarding rights is the function of judiciary.
公司中存在权利生态链。股东权利是公司中其他权利的母体。经由股东的行为而产生了公司的团体人格。股东权利和公司权利的分隔保持了各自的独立人格。维持公司独立人格的最佳组织构造模式，应当是设立一个强大的董事会而不是股东会。董事会成员不一定是股东，只有未必全由股东构成的经营团队，才能相对独立地考虑另一个人格主体——公司的利益。11股东、公司、董事是公司权利生态链中的主要链接点，此外还有债权人、公司职工等其他权利人。每个链条上权利的过度膨胀或明显薄弱，都会破坏公司权利的“生态平衡”。因此对权利的救济是维持公司权利生态平衡的外部手段。公司法上相关主体间纠纷是否解决，权利有否得到保障，是衡量司法权介入公司治理有效性的基本标准。
There is a rights chain in companies, and shareholders’ rights are the base for other rights in the companies. It is through shareholders’ conduct that a group personality of companies is established. The separation of the shareholders’ rights and companies’ rights maintain their own independent personality. The best organization and structure mode for maintaining companies’ independent personality should be the establishment of a powerful board of directors not a board of shareholders. The members in a board of directors do not have to be shareholders themselves.
Only by an operations group which is not comprised of shareholders completely, can the other personality subject—companies’ benefits¬¬--- be taken into consideration independently.11 Besides some main linking points in the rights chain of companies such as shareholders, companies, and directors, there are debtors, staff in companies and other rights-holders. The “ecological balance” of companies’ rights will be destroyed if the rights of each chain are too strong or too weak. Therefore, the remedy on rights is an exterior practice to maintain the ecological balance of companies’ rights. The fundamental standards on evaluating the effectiveness of the jurisdiction’s intervention to company management are whether disputes among relevant parties in company law get settled, and whether the rights get safeguarded.
2.司法的秩序维持功能（秩序维护型介入）。
(2).Order maintenance function of jurisdiction (intervention in an order maintenance type)
民事诉讼使当事人获得程序上胜诉的保障，进而使当事人行为时可以预测裁判结果，自律地依据实体法基准规范来相互生活，社会生活整体得以安定。12公司自治是以公司治理结构为支撑的公司内、外部私人秩序。好的公司治理是公司、股东、董事、经理、债权人、员工等多元利益主体间的形成的公平、有序和有效的自治结构系统。司法权介入公司治理，除了化解纠纷、保障权利，矫正公司自治的失灵与无序。
Civil action enables parties to obtain safeguards when successful, so that the parties can predict the result of planning and performing in accordance with the norms and regulations of substantial law. Self-discipline in compliance results in an overall stable social life.12 Company autonomy is a private order inside and outside companies supported by a company management structure. Good company management is a fair, orderly, and effective autonomous structural system formed by multiple rights-holders such as companies, shareholders, directors, managers, debtors, staffs. Jurisdiction’s intervention in company management can correct the malfunction and disorder of company autonomy besides settling disputes and safeguarding rights.
（二）司法具有能动性
2. Jurisdiction with activity.
司法机构作为公司治理系统的组成部分，有效及时干预公司自治活动，引导公司完善公司的治理结构，使公司自治回归正义、公平和有效的公司治理目标。
As a part of a corporate governance system, the judicial body gives effective and timely intervention to corporate autonomy, and leads to a perfect corporate governance structure so as to achieve the goal of justice, fairness, and effectiveness for corporate governance.
司法能动主义是普通法制度的产品,严格说是围绕司法审查与宪法的历史关系而展开的一个术语。布莱克法律辞典作了一经典定义，指一种司法裁决的哲学，它允许法官根据他们对有关公共政策等因素的个人见识指引裁判,这就暗示着该种哲学具有倾向于打破宪章、罔顾先例的禀性。13司法能动主义与司法限制主义此消彼长。司法能动性的运用，实质上是对法官自由裁量权的认可，让法官站在法律的缺口与流变的社会生活的交接处，提炼规则、填补缝隙，以扩大法律的内涵，开放法律的处延，避免法律的具体适用与正义决裂。丹宁勋爵曾绝妙地说明了法官自由裁量之弥补法律局限性的功能以及应遵循的基本准则:“法官绝不可以改变法律织物的纺织材料，但是他可以，也应该把褶皱熨平。”14
Judicial activism, a product of the common law system, is a term surrounding the historical relationship of judicial reviews and constitutions. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines judicial activism as “a philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usually suggesting that adherents of this philosophy tend to make constitutional violations and are willing to ignore precedent.” 13There exists a trade-off relationship between judicial activism and judicial restraint. The application of judicial activism is a confirmation on judicial discretion, which allows judges to extract rules and bridge law gaps to ensure the integration of specific application of laws and justice. Lord Denning had explained the complementary function of judicial discretion for legal limits, and described the basic principle to be followed by judicial discretion as “Judges must not change the texture of laws but ironing the folds”.14
坚持司法能动主义，需要警惕保守司法观念。保守司法观念之一认为，公司内部管理事务法院不应干预，法院不应介入公司的经营决策活动，不涉及公司商业方面的营业判断。在私法领域，奉行“有纠纷即裁决”的司法准则，“法院不得以法律未规定为由拒绝裁判民事纠纷”是民事司法的基本原则。司法绝对不介入公司事务的观念，显然不符合司法最终裁决的原则。还有一种保守司法观念认为，司法介入对公司内部事务的审查，即等同于干预企业，犹如大陆计划经济年代“政企不分”和政府的过度管控。司法应尊重公司的经营，不积极主动介入公司，但并不意味着司法要像行政一样离公司“越远越好”，司法与行政毕竟担负着别样的职能。
Conservative judicial concepts need to be alert while judicial activism is followed. One of the conservative judicial concepts is that the court should not intervene in corporate internal management, corporate operations and decision-making activities, or corporate business judgments. Jurisdiction pursues a judicial criterion of “ruling follows disputes”. “The court shall not reject to adjudicate civil disputes on the ground of no provision provided in law” is the basic norms of civil justice. The conception that justice never intervenes in corporate affairs does not accord with the principle of final judicial adjudication. Another conservative judicial concept is that a judicial view on corporate internal affairs is equal to intervening in corporate management, which is similar to the governmental over-controlling of companies in China’s planned economy era. Jurisdiction plays a different role from that of administration. Jurisdiction should respect corporate operations, which does not mean jurisdiction needs to be away from corporate operations such as administration.
(三)司法谨慎介入公司事务
3. Wary Judicial intervention to the company affairs.
司法权介入公司自治，基于不同事项和不同领域，呈现的介入积极性完全不同。公司法已经作出规定禁止性规定调整事项，法官在裁判中可积极介入。司法权介入公司自治事项时，比如涉及到商业判断事项时，法官由于并非从事商业活动的商人，此类事项的介入不得不谨慎从事。公司股东未经公司内部救济程序，将属于公司内部事务诉诸法院予以解决的，法院应当拒绝介入。
Judicial intervention in corporate autonomy has different intervention initiatives based on different affairs and fields. The company law has prescribed the adjusting affairs of prohibitions on which judges can be actively involved. When intervening in corporate autonomy related to business judgment, judges should be wary of the intervention, because judges are not specialized in commercial activities. If shareholders appeal corporate internal affairs to the court for settlement before going through the remedy procedures within the corporation the court should reject the request to intervene.
进入公司治理纠纷领域，司法能动主义已超越了对公权力审查的内涵，有了介入私人秩序新的注释，它既要解决法官在遭遇公司法不确定性如何自由裁量问题，也要解决司法积极干预公司事务的范围和机制问题。司法介入公司自治是有限干预。“司法扩张和司法谨慎一直贯穿着英美国家公司法的发展历程”15，其中之曲折、之得失、之奥妙，值得我们认真总结。司法的积极介入一般是发生于公司治理危机之时，是背负了社会正义的使命、为矫正市场失序而进行。
In the field of corporate governance disputes, judicial activism exceeds the connotation of review by public power, and is added to with a new connotation of intervention in the private order. It needs to deal with both judicial discretion under the uncertainty of company law, and the range and mechanisms of judicial intervention to corporate business. Judicial intervention to corporate autonomy is limited. “Judicial expansion and discretion have been throughout the development history of company laws in the Anglo-American countries”, 15which is worthy summarizing. Active judicial intervention often occurs when corporate governance faces risks, and aims to uphold the social justice and correct market disordering.
在美国，司法能动主义多为霍姆斯开创的法律现实主义学派所运用，在处理具体争议时，除了左手小心翼翼捧着法典外，右手还要伸出，来充分触摸到具体案件的事实、案件的社会影响、道德、伦理、政策、法律原则等综合因素，在衡平的基础上作出最后决定。因此，在通过法官的活动而介入到公司治理司法过程中，法官对公司事务的审查应当坚持合法性审查为主，合理性审查为辅，形式审查为主，实质审查为辅的审查方针，对公司事务保持谨慎的态度，尊重公司自治、维护公司秩序。
In the US judicial activism is mostly used by the legal realism school created by Holmes. When a judge deals with a specific dispute, a balance needs to be made between codes tightly held in his left hand and some integrated factors such as specific case contents, social influences, mortality, ethics, policies, and legal principles touched by his right hand. Based on this balance, a final decision is made. Therefore, when a judge is involved in corporate governance affairs in the name of judicial review, he /she has to adhere to the principles of legality review first while a rationality review is second, and a formal examination first while a substantial examination second, so as to be wary of corporate affairs, respect corporate autonomy, and maintain corporate ordering.
司法介入公司治理，防止股东的机会主义。如果实施诉讼或者非诉讼的司法救济方法的成本很低，很可能在便利中小股东维权的同时带来机会主义的弊端!因为一旦司法介入到公司争议之中，管理层必然要花费精力去应付，在一定程度上损害了公司的整体利益!基于这种风险的考虑，很多当事人可能就以此作为换取其他不正当利益的筹码，以达到敲诈公司的目的!
Judicial intervention to corporate governance could prevent some shareholders’ opportunism. If the cost of suing, or judicial remedies without suing, is low, it may cause the disadvantages associated with opportunism while easing the rights protection of minority stockholders. Once justice intervenes in corporate disputes, the corporate management must make efforts to deal with the intervention, causing some damages to the whole corporation’s benefits. Considering this risk, many shareholders may make use of this risk to blackmail a corporation in exchange for improper benefits.
在股东自治理念的指引下，公司法逐步采取法院中心主义。但是，公司法的法院中心主义并不是授权法院或法官在处理公司纠纷案件时可以自以为是，代替股东作出判断或者侵犯股东的自治权利。公司股东自治的理念表明，“个人是其自身利益的最佳法官”，一方面，法院对于公司行为的审查应当尊重公司股东对公司事务的自主安排，另一方面，即使法院需要对公司进行干预，也应当在一定的限度之内，坚持有限干预的原则。司法救济作为私人权利保护的最后一道防线，对于私人权利的维护具有举足轻重的作用。然而私人权利的维护显然应当首先由私人按照“私力解决程序优先”原则进行处理，只有当私力解决无法奏效的情况下，国家的公权力才能介入私人的领域。公司内部纠纷的处理同样如此，股东自治是公司法律的基本理念，股东对公司内部事务的自主处理理应受到尊重，只有当股东无力解决，即“竭尽公司内部救济”之时，法院才能对公司事务进行实体性的干预。法院或法官尊重股东自治的理念的确立，才能使股东自治的理想逐步得到实现。
Under the guidance of shareholder autonomy, company law is gradually inclined to take a court as the center. However, it does not mean that the court can make judgments for shareholders or infringe the corporate autonomous rights of shareholders. The concept of shareholder autonomy suggests that “individuals are the best judges of their own interests”. The court should respect shareholders’ arrangements on corporate affairs in judicial review, and the judicial intervention to corporate affairs should insist on the principle of limited intervention. As the last defensive line of personal rights, judicial remedy is of great importance for defending personal rights. The defense of personal rights needs to be firstly handled according to the principle with private settlement processes as a priority. If the private settlement process does not work, the public power can intervene in the private fields. And it is true of handling internal disputes of a corporation. The court should respect shareholder’s autonomy on corporate affairs, and can intervene in the corporate affairs only when the shareholders fail to settle the disputes. The realization of shareholder autonomy depends on establishing the concept of respecting shareholder autonomy from the perspective of the court and judges.
（一）完善普通民事诉讼程序介入公司治理的制度
1. Perfecting the system of introducing ordinary civil procedure to corporate governance
公司法对实体权利的保护已经做出了规定，但在通过普通民事诉讼审理的个案中，涉及司法能动地干预公司内部决定事务，涉及经营者判断的问题，司法机构不能回避，而应当通过法解释的进路和方法，细化、落实公司法规定的实体权利的司法救济机制。以股东权的保护为例，现有公司法内，虽然已经给予了比较充分的保护，但是相对保守、刚性，对严重于公司法规定情形之外的损害股东权利的行为，没有一个概括的救济和保护机制。如对损害部分股东利益的公司决议无效之确认；对严重损害其他股东利益的股权转让之无效确认与禁止；强制公司或其他股东购买受股东会决议不公平损害股东之股份。还有诸如股东派生诉讼应用范围的扩大，股份回购的确认及估价，对公司章程、公司规章合法性的审查等公司治理中的纠纷，也需要在现有的公司法框架下，在普通民事诉讼程序中，通过解释法律，能动司法加以解决。
The Company Law has provisions on protection of substantive rights. In those cases heard through ordinary civil procedure and involving active judicial intervention in the internal decisions of the company and the policymaking of the operator, however, the judicial bodies shall specify and fulfill the mechanism of judicial remedies on substantive rights protection stipulated in the Company Law through the approach of judicial interpretation. The protection of shareholders' rights is an example.
In the existing Company Law, considerable protection has been given to the rights of shareholders, but it is relatively conservative and rigid. It lacks a broader remedy and protection mechanism towards those behaviors that are harmful to the rights of shareholders and are not listed in the Company Law. Examples are lacking a mechanism or policy to remove invalid decisions that could damage parts of the shareholders' rights; to confirm or forbid the stock right transfer that could damage the rights of other shareholders; to force the company or other shareholders to purchase the stock of the shareholder who is treated with unfair prejudice from by a resolution of a shareholder meeting. In the framework of existing Company Law, the following situations shall be handled through the ordinary civil procedure by judicial interpretation: the expansion of shareholder derivative action, the confirmation and valuation of targeted share repurchases and the disputes in corporate governance such as the examination of the legality to the rules, regulation and articles of incorporation.
英国公司法上的不公平损害之救济制度值得借鉴。当不公平行为满足对公司章程违反同时，通常也是对股东个人权利的侵害。普通法对公司章程赋予的股东的个人权利采用了一种比较严苛的行使方法，股东不能就“内部不规则”起诉。英国学者认为，股东的个人权利是多数股东没有权利决定变更或放弃的，主张对股东权益的维护，从章程规范的权利扩张到合理期待下的其他权益。1962年公司法律委员会(Company Law Committee，即金肯斯委员会，Jenkins Committee)提出了替代“压制行为”的不公平损害”救济，建议扩大法院的司法权，使法院能基于衡平原则，干涉公司事务，对不公平损害行为给予救济。这一建议直到1980年才得以在公司法中加以规定。
The unfair predjudice remedy mechanism in British Company Law is worth drawing on. Unfair conducts violating the by-laws of the company usually infringe the personal rights of the shareholders. In the Common Law, shareholders exercise their personal rights endowed by the by-laws of the company in a limited way. They cannot file a lawsuit against internal irregularity. British scholars believe that the personal rights of a shareholder shall not be changed or removed by other shareholders and they advocate the protection of shareholder's rights by expanding their rights endowed by the by-laws to other rights within reasonable anticipation. In 1962, the Company Law Committee also known as Jenkins Committee put up a remedy to unfair predjudical actions and proposed to expand the judicial power of the court so as to enable the court to interfere with the affairs of the company by offering remedies to unfair prejudicial actions based on the principle of equity. This proposal was not adopted by the British Company Law until 1980.
《英国公司法》第994条规定:如果公司事务正在或者己经以对公司成员的整体利益或者部分成员(至少包括他自己)的利益造成不公平损害的方式进行；或者公司的任何实际发生的或计划进行的作为或者不作为正在造成或将要造成一种不公平损害，公司的成员可以向法公司的成员可以向法院提出申请获得救济。16在金肯斯委员会报告中，认为“不公平”是明显背离了公平交易的标准,违反了每一个把资金投入公司的股东的有权依赖的公平的游戏规则。 对于不公平损害的检验标准，判例认为它是一种客观的标准而不应当是主观的标准，即不要求申请人证明被告的行为是出于恶意，即使被告的行为不是恶意伤害申请人，只要其结果构成了不公平损害，法院就认定不公平损害成立。
Article 994 in British Company Law stipulates that a member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order on the grounds that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be so prejudicial.16 The Jenkins Committee's report points out that unfairness obviously deviates from fair trade standards, violating the fair game rule set by the shareholders who invest money into the company.17 The legal precedent considers the test criterion of an unfair prejudice as objective rather than subjective, which means that the applicant is not required to testify whether the behavior of the defendant is out of malice. That is to say the court will affirm the establishment of an unfair prejudice when the result leads to unfair prejudice no matter whether the behavior of the defendant is out of malice or not.
不公平损害最经常使用的救济方式是命令和令状。对不公平行为损害股东权利的，法院命令公司或者公司的其他成员购买股东的股份，以“用脚投票”的方式彻底使股东脱离纠葛 股东处于可怜的令人同情的位置，又是被迫离开公司，只有他的股份没有折扣低卖出才是公平的。18。关于日期，法院可能会选择:不公平行为发生之日、诉讼申请递交日、股份购买令状颁行日及其评估价格令状执行之日。对于具体案件应选用哪个基准，法官意见并不一致。威恩劳特法官(Vinelott J)认为评估日期应当是诉讼申请之日，因为申请人在那天做出控诉不公平损害的决定，也正是从这一天开始，双方的合作基础不再存在。19诺斯法官(Nourse J)认为命令颁发之日作为基准日比较适合，因为基本利益应当在决定被购买的那一天做出估价才合适。20
The most commonly used remedies for unfair prejudice are command and writ. When the rights of a shareholder are infringed by unfair conduct, the court will order the company or other shareholders in the company to buy the stock of the shareholder so as to help the shareholder get rid of the awkward situation in which he/she is forced to leave the company. But it is fair only when the stock of the shareholder is not sold at a low price with a discount. 18With regard to the base date, the court may choose one from the following options: the date of occurrence of unfair behavior, the date of filing the application, the date of issuing the stock purchase warrant or the date of evaluating the price warrant. The judges’ opinions vary from one to another when it comes to choosing the date in a specific case. The judge Vinelott J believed that the evaluation date shall be the date of filing the application on the grounds that on this day the applicant decides to file a lawsuit against the unfair prejudice and the cooperative foundation of the two sides no longer exists on the same day.19 The judge Nourse J believes that the base date shall be the date of issuing the stock purchase warrant on the grounds that it is appropriate to evaluate the basic interest when it is decided to be purchased.20
当不公平损害行为是公司本身行为的失当时，对于公司正在进行的行为或将要进行作为或不作为有悖股东权益的案件，法院将会做出要求公司从事某一行为的令状。从诉讼救济申请的提出到法院颁行令状需要时日，会产生行动上的迟延和耽搁，造成因阻止不及时使不公平行为对原告造成了现实的损害，如原告被驱逐出公司股东之列等。在此情形下，原告需要申请法院颁行临时令状，法院会在充分考虑令状对原告权益维护和公司正常运营秩序的影响后作出适当的决定。更多时候，法院还会颁行维持现状的令状，这一令状旨在固定公司现状保证申请人利益不受损害。
When the unfair infringement is caused by the misconduct of the company itself, the judicial court will issue a writ that the company should perform an act based on the case in which the company is conducting or will conduct an act, or even an omission, if it infringes the shareholder’s rights. After the petition for litigation relief, there will be a period of time before the court issues the writ, causing delay of actions and untimely prevention from actual harm of unfair practices to the claimant, like being expelled from the shareholders. Under such a circumstance, the claimant should apply for a temporary command, which will take into full consideration in the decisions, the command effects on the operation order of the company and the protection of the claimant rights. More often, the court will also issue a present-situation-maintenance command for the purpose of guarding the petitioner’s rights under a fixed situation.
我们建议，引入不公平损害救济制度，在普通民事诉讼程序中，赋予法院以命令（令状 ）的职权，从而有效地干预公司中的“多数人暴政”，保护少数股东的财产性权利遭受不公平损害。至于股份股价，应当坚持“只有他的股份没有折扣低卖出才是公平的”原则；关于估价的时间，从公平的角度而言，自原告提出诉讼之日起，原告股东与其他股东及其公司董事之间的信任或者信托关系宣告破裂，由此原告不能继续要求分享申请日之后，基于被告或者其他经营者方法得当的获得的收益；相反，当公司被诉讼所困导致营业精力削减、经营时间减少、公司信誉降低等造成不利后果，原告也不应当分担由此产生的不利后果。因此，将评估日期确定为诉讼提出之次日，这个价格对于双方均是不确定的，以便更好地保障股权公平的价值目标的实现。
The adoption of an unfair infringement remedy system, in ordinary civil procedural lawsuits, and granting the court the authority of command (writ) to intervene in the phenomenon of “tyranny of the majority” in the company and protect the property rights of a few shareholders from unfair infringement. As to stock price, the principle should be “it is fair only when one’s stock is not sold at a low price with discount”; and as to the date of evaluation, from the perspective of equity, from the day the claimant institutes the legal proceedings to the day he/she submits the application, he/she could not continue to require sharing the profits gained from the proper management of the accused or other managers caused by the breach of trust deeds between the claimant and other shareholders or directors of the company; on the contrary, the claimant shall not assume unfavorable consequences would be caused by a reduction of management vigor, business hours or the company’s reputation resulting from the proceeding. Accordingly, we should fix the date of evaluation on the second day of the proceeding, which is a price indeterminate for both sides. In this way, the value target of ensuring stock equality can be better realized.
（二）构建商事特别程序介入公司治理
2. Setting up special business procedure for corporate governance 大陆法系国家多以特别的程序（非讼程序）提前介入到公司的内部治理，日本最为典型。在《日本商法典》中专章规定了司法介入公司治理的特别程序，2006年4月开始施行的公司法中，增加设置了有关公司的非诉讼程序法的规定。该法特别规定了非诉讼的程序规定，如董事的解任、董事会的召集等。法院不是以裁判形式处理纠纷，而是以司法命令的方式介入公司管理，矫正、协调公司的正常运作。
The civil law countries mostly concentrate on special procedures (non-litigation procedures) to intervene in the company’s inner governance ahead of time, as is typically the case in Japan. More specifically, the Japanese Commercial Code has an exclusive chapter on special procedures for judicial intervention into corporate governance. Moreover, in its company law, that came into force in April 2006, there is an additional provision on the non-litigation procedural law of companies, including the dismissal of director, the convening of board of directors and so on. In order to rectify and coordinate the operations of a company, the court intervenes in the company’s management via judicial order instead of judgment when dealing with disputes.
经过审判实践经验总结，从公司设立到终止整个过程中可能出现的各种纠纷概括为48种类型。21但是，适用普通民事诉讼程序解决一切公司纠纷的做法遇到了极大地困难与挑战，在已有的公司纠纷类型中至少有以下案件在适用普通民事诉讼程序处理时难以取得良好的裁判效果，需要适用特别程序。特别程序的公司诉讼不以公司利益主体间权利义务争执的裁判为目标，而是直接采取一些具体措施介入公司的运行，相对于通常程序的事后救济和监督功能而言，特别程序着重于预防，通过法院的提前介入，促使公司机关运行有效，防止公司内部不公平行为之发生，避免公司及相关人权利受损。
According to experience from some countries concentrating on judicial judgment, all disputes possibly arising from the establishment to the dissolution of a company are summarized as 48 types.21 However, adopting ordinary civil procedure to solve every company dispute has been obstructed by enormous difficulties and challenges. Existing types of company disputes possess at least the following cases that are available to special procedure when the company fails to obtain favorable judgment through ordinary civil procedure. In terms of function, the special procedure focuses on prevention while the usual procedure is on remedy afterwards and supervision. The special procedure does not aim to make a judgment on the dispute of rights and obligations between parties, but takes some detailed measures to intervene in the company operation. By means of judicial intervention, it is possible to promote the effective operation, prevent unfair behaviors and avoid the infringement of company’s as well as the related parties’ interests The cases of special business procedure related to company are as follows:
1．股东权利表彰性案件，如股东请求公司填写并在公司置备股东名册，请求公司签发出资证明书，请求公司对股权变更登记等案件。
(1). The case of rights recognition of shareholders such as shareholders request the company to prepare and fill in a roster of the shareholders, sign and issue an investment certificate, and register the modification of shares.
2．股东知情权案件。具体包括：查阅、复制公司章程等材料，查阅会计账簿；股东请求公司披露董事、监事、高级管理人员的报酬，公众公司股东请求知悉公司经营活动和重大并购、诉讼等信息。
(2). The case of shareholder’s right to be informed; specifically including: reviewing and duplicating company materials, reviewing the financial reports; requesting the company to disclose the information about remunerations received by the directors, supervisors and senior managers. The public shareholders can request the company to disclose the information about business activities, major acquisition and litigation.
3．股东会、董事会、监事会的召集纠纷案件，包括不合规的召集、消极不作为以及有权召集人依法召集时寻求司法的支持等案件。
(3). The case of dispute on the convening of shareholders' assembly, board of directors and board of supervisors; including the cases like irregular convening, negative omission, and if the entitled convener appeals to judicial support to conducting a temporary board meeting in accordance with the law.
4．董事、监事、高级管理人员的任职与解任纠纷案件。
(4).The case of dispute on appointment and dismissal of director, supervisors and senior Managers;
5．监事等职权的行使。如监事依法行使监督权公司的积极配合、障碍消除以及费用的支持。
(5). The case of exercising power; including supervisors exercise of authority in accordance with law under the circumstance where the company actively participates in, eliminates obstacles and offers financial support.
6．股份的估价纠纷案件。包括股份回购纠纷中价格争议纠纷，特定情由下强制大股东收购小股东股权纠纷。
(6). The case of disputes on share valuation; including price dispute in share repurchase and share dispute where the major shareholder is forced to purchase the minor shareholder’s share under the specific instance.
7．公司清算纠纷。公司清算由一系列行为构成，清理公司财产，通知或者公告债权人，处理与清算公司的未了结的业务，清缴欠缴税款，清理债权债务，分配剩余财产，参加有关诉讼活动等。清算的特殊性决定其应使用特别司法程序。
(7). The case of dispute on the liquidation of company; the following functions during the process of liquidation may be exercised: liquidating the properties of the company; notifying creditors by mail or public announcement; handling and liquidating the unfinished business of the company; paying off the outstanding taxes and the taxes incurred in the process of liquidation; distributing the remaining properties; and participating in the civil proceedings of the company. The liquidation specialists decide when the special procedure should be involved.
在司法实践中，最高人民法院通过司法解释的途径，已经上述案件中的部分内容如公司清算程序作出了特殊规定，但仍在现行的普通民事诉讼程序框架内进行，特别程序的专门化、体系化尚待进一步建构和完善。本文认为，我国公司法可借鉴西方国家司法干预公司治理的理念、制度以及措施，构建与我国民事诉讼制度相匹配的公司纠纷的非诉讼介入机制，赋予法院对公司、高管违法以及不公平损害行为的司法制止（禁令）权、无效宣告权，司法选任权，司法解任权，司法召集股东大会权。借由此径，化解公司治理中的非正义不公平以行为，维护公司正常的治理秩序，提高公司治理的效率。
In judicial practices, the Supreme People's Court of China has made special provisions on part of the said cases, like the liquidation of company by judicial interpretation. This provision, however, is still exercised within the framework of existing ordinary civil procedure. A professional and systematic special procedure needs to be further established and improved.
This paper argues that China should learn the concepts, institutions and measures of judicial intervention to company governance from western countries and build a non-litigation intervening mechanism paired with China’s civil action system to solve company disputes. Courts should be entrusted some rights to punish violating and unfair conduct by company staff, including the right of judicial curb (ban), the right of invalidation, the right of judicial selection, the right of judicial dismissal and the right of judicially convening stockholders' meeting. Thereby, it is possible to defuse injustice and unfairness, maintain the normal order and enhance the efficiency of corporate governance.
（三）通过专业审判庭介入公司治理
3. Drawing support from judicial experts 司法介入公司治理，司法人员应当对公司治理活动、对公司法内在本质都有较高的专业积累，必要时，关涉公司事务的专门性问题时，应吸收该领域的专家进入合议庭，从而保证司法介入公司事务的质量，发挥司法对公司治理的积极作用。
Judicial officials should have a profound professional knowledge of corporate governance, and the intrinsic nature of company law as putting judicial intervention into company governance. In the face of professional problems related to company affairs, it is necessary to draw the experts of this field to participate in a collegiate bench, ensuring the quality of judicial intervention and exerting positive effect of the judicature on corporate governance.
美国特拉华州由大法官法院专门管辖受理公司案件，法官有70%的时间花在公司事务上。这些法官之前都有在市场领域的执业背景,对商业交易拥有一定的经验,因而被誉为全美对公司法事务最有学知的司法系统。在英国,英格兰法院系统中常由12名大法官法院的法官审理公司法律事务,比北美的同事们对公司诉讼的关键机制拥有更好的理解22。
In Delaware of the US the cases of company law are exclusively accepted by the court of chancery, where judges spend 70 percent of their time on company affairs. Due to having a professional background in the field of capital markets before getting into the court, these judges gain experience and are honored as the most learned people who deal with company affair in the US. In the court system of Britain, there are usually 12 judges from court of the chancery to tackle company affairs, which is a better reflection of the key mechanism of company litigation than that of North America22.
司法介入公司治理，现有的司法资源有一定的局限，尤其是普通法官的专业水准与此类案件所要求的有一定距离，尤其在自由裁量权的把握上。因此，法院应设立独立、专门的商事法庭，向“专家会诊”的审理模式转化。由于公司治理纠纷专业性、技术性要求高，可明确由公司住所地的法院享有专属管辖权、对于上市公司由公司所在地的 中级人民法院管辖，以保障此类案件的受理与管辖便利、高效地进行。而且，可以通过组建陪审团、吸收公司法律、会计、管理方面的专家学者和企业、商会德高望重人士加盟，使案件审理向“专家会诊”模式转型。
Existing judicial resources are limited, especially the professional level of common judges cannot meet the requirements that case law expects. For example, a court’s discretionary power is not exercised well. Therefore courts should set up independent and special commercial courts and shift the hearing model to “consulting specialists”. Considering the high professional skill involved in the case of corporate governance, the court in the domicile of a company should be given a clear exclusive jurisdiction and a listed company should be under the jurisdiction of the local intermediate people’s court.
These measures guarantee that cases are accepted and administered more easily and effectively. At the same time, other feasible measures should be taken to include “specialist consultants”, including organizing the jury, drawing experts in the field of law, accounting and administration of a company, as well as drawing highly respected people from enterprises and chambers of commerce.
由于缺乏公司法的规定，即使最高人民法院可以通过司法解释的方法，对某些案件的审理作出解释，但是，司法解释的出台堪比公司法修改的节奏，面对层出不穷的实践问题，最高院以及各地高级法院，通过判例指导的方法，指引司法适度介入公司治理，无疑是比较妥当的和成本较低的做法。
The speed to modify company law is much slower than that of unveiling of judicial interpretation, on the basis of which the Supreme People's Court of China deals with a certain case, causing a lack of provision of company law. In face of boundless issues in practice, the Supreme People's Court and the supreme courts of various regions direct the judiciary to moderately intervene in company governance by the guidance of precedents, which undoubtedly is a relatively appropriate and low-cost way.